| Title: | STRATEGIC VOTING UNDER THE PLURALITY RULE WITHOUT THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE ASSUMPTION
We are grateful to members of CREME whose suggestions and comments have been crucial for this work. |
| DOI No: | 10.1142/9789812702487_0029 |
| Source: | CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN MATHEMATICAL PHYSICS (pp 511-518)
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| Author(s): | NICOLAS GABRIEL ANDJIGA
Ecole Normale Supérieure, Université de Yaoundé I, B.P. 47, Yaoundé, Republic of Cameroon
ISSOFA MOYOUWOU
Faculté des Sciences, Université de Yaoundé I, B.P. 812, Yaoundé, Republic of Cameroon
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| Abstract: | The information on some best alternative of some voter can decide an individual to misrepresent strategically his sincere preference under a plurality voting (simple majority rule). We characterize such informations and then deduce the minimal informations required to manipulate. |
| Full Text: | View full text in PDF format (350KB) |
| TOC: | Back to Table of Contents |
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